In this paper I try to determine whether international trade has been increasing the own-price elasticity of demand for U.S. labor in recent decades. The empirical work yields three main results. First, from 1961 through 1991 demand for U.S. production labor became more elastic in manufacturing overall and in five of eight industries within manufacturing. Second, during this time U.S. nonproduction-labor demand did not become more elastic in manufacturing overall or in any of the eight industries within manufacturing. If anything, demand seems to be growing less elastic over time. Third, the hypothesis that trade contributed to increased elasticities has mixed support, at best. For production labor many trade-related variables have the predicted effect for specifications with only industry controls, but these predicted effects disappear when time controls are included as well. For nonproduction labor things are somewhat better, but time continues to be a very strong predictor of elasticity patterns. Thus the time series of labor-demand elasticities are explained largely by a residual, time itself. This result parallels the common finding in studies of rising wage inequality. Just as there seems to be a large unexplained residual for changing factor prices over time, there also seems to be a large unexplained residual for changing factor demand elasticities over time.
Introduction
In recent years a number of economists have researched whether international trade has contributed to the ongoing rise in the U.S. relative price between more-skilled and less-skilled labor. There is still no clear consensus, however, about how much international trade has mattered. Many people find this ambiguity difficult to reconcile with the large amount of anecdotal evidence that trade has been placing substantial "pressure" on labor markets. In this paper I look for pressure not in the prices for labor but rather in the elasticities of demand for labor. I examine whether trade has been increasing firms' equilibrium own-price elasticity of demand for labor.
In theory trade can change labor-demand elasticities without changing labor prices. As will be discussed, trade can make labor demand more elastic in two main ways: by making output markets more competitive and by making domestic labor more substitutable with foreign factors. Trade can generate these effects without also generating product-price changes and, via the StolperSamuelson theorem, factor price changes. 1 This means that finding little effect of trade on wages can be entirely consistent with finding a large effect of trade on elasticities. If this is the case then the proper interpretation of trade "pressuring" labor markets might hinge on elasticities. 2 To determine trade's effect on labor-demand elasticities the empirical work proceeds in two stages. First, using the NBER Productivity Data Base I estimate a time series from as far back as 1961 through 1991 of own-price demand elasticities for production labor and nonproduction labor for U.S. manufacturing overall and for manufacturing disaggregated into eight industries. The goal is to identify robust patterns over time in labor-demand elasticities. Second, I regress these estimated elasticities on several plausible measures of trade, technology, and institutional factors which can influence labor-demand elasticities. These stage-two regressions try to explain patterns in the stage-one elasticities with patterns in trade, technology, and labor-market institutions.
The empirical work yields three main results. First, over time demand for production labor has become more elastic in manufacturing overall and in five of eight industries within manufacturing.
The elasticity fluctuated around -0.5 until the mid-1970s, but then it dropped steadily to around -1.0 by 1991. Second, nonproduction-labor demand has not become more elastic in manufacturing overall or in any of the industries within manufacturing. Almost all estimates range somewhere between -0.5 and -0.8, and if anything, demand seems to be growing less elastic over time.
Third, the hypothesis that trade contributed to increased elasticities has mixed support, at best.
For production labor many trade variables have the predicted effect for specifications containing as regressors only these variables or them plus industry fixed effects. However, these predicted effects generally disappear when time controls are included as well. For nonproduction labor things are somewhat better. Four plausible trade-related variables (narrow and broad outsourcing, the foreign-affiliate share of U.S. multinational corporations' assets, net exports as a share of shipments) have the predicted sign at at least the 90% level of significance even when both industry and time controls are included. For both labor types time is a very strong predictor of elasticity patterns, with production (nonproduction) demand becoming progressively more (less) elastic.
This result parallels the common finding in studies of wage inequality. Just as there appears to be a large unexplained residual for changing factor prices, there also appears to be a large unexplained residual for changing factor demand elasticities. This paper has four subsequent sections. Section two presents the theory of how trade can make factor demands more elastic. Section three presents the stage-one regressions: related empirical work, the data, specification issues, and results. Section four similarly presents the stage-two regressions. Section five concludes.
Theoretical Framework The Economic Importance of Labor-Demand Elasticities
It's easy to understand how changing labor prices are important. When less-skilled wages decline in real terms people can suffer welfare declines. When less-skilled wages decline relative to more-skilled wages greater political discord can arise as well.
Why are changing labor-demand elasticities important? Rodrik (1997) explains three important implications of more-elastic factor demands. First, higher elasticities shift the wage and/or employment incidence of non-wage labor costs (e.g., payroll taxes) towards labor away from employers. Second, higher elasticities trigger more-volatile responses of wages and/or employment to any exogenous shock to labor demand. 3 Third, higher elasticities shift from labor towards capital bargaining power over rent distribution in firms which enjoy extranormal profits.
In recent decades the U.S. economy has definitely experienced these second and third implications: rising and more-variable within-group income inequality, and declining labor bargaining power (as measured by declining unionization). Although most recent research on rising U.S. inequality has focused on the economy-wide skill premium, within-group inequality accounts for over half of the rise in overall inequality. This rise in within-group inequality actually predates by several years the rise in the skill premium (see, e.g., Katz and Murphy, 1992) . At the same time that inequality within groups has been rising, so, too, has earnings instability within groups --both transitory and permanent income variation (see Gottschalk and Moffit, 1994) . As for unionization, Freeman (1988) documents that the U.S. private-sector unionization rate fell from about 38% in 1950 to 14% in 1986; by 1998 this rate had fallen to 9.5%. As Rodrik (1997) discusses, all these developments can in principle be caused by rising labor-demand elasticities.
Yet relatively little research has tried to clarify the causes of these developments. Accordingly, analyzing trends in labor-demand elasticities directly seems worthwhile.
The Labor Economics of Labor-Demand Elasticities
This paper draws on both labor theory and international-trade theory to understand what determines labor-demand elasticities. On the labor side, Hamermesh (1993) summarizes what determines an industry's equilibrium own-price labor-demand elasticity with "the fundamental law of factor demand" (p. 24). Modifying his notation slightly, here is the law.
(1)
In (1), η LLj is industry j's own-price labor-demand elasticity defined to be negative; s is labor's share of industry total revenue; σ LL is the constant-output elasticity of substitution between labor and all other factors of production; and η j is the product-demand elasticity for industry j's output market. The variables s, σ LL , and η j are all defined to be positive.
As written in (1), η LLj consists of two parts. The first, -[1-s]σ LL , is the "substitution effect."
It tells, for a given level of output, how much the industry substitutes away from labor towards other factors when wages rise. This term -[1-s]σ LL is often called the constant-output labordemand elasticity, distinct from the total elasticity η LLj . The second part of (1), -sη j , is the "output effect" or "scale effect." It tells how much labor demand changes after a wage change thanks to the change in the industry's output. Higher (lower) wages imply higher (lower) costs and thus, moving along the product-market demand schedule, lower (higher) industry output.
When wages rise, both the substitution and scale effects reduce labor demand. The industry substitutes away from labor towards other factors, and with higher costs the industry produces less output such that it demands less of all factors. Thus, η LLj < 0: labor demand slopes downward.
How International Trade Affects Labor-Demand Elasticities: Scale Effect
What does international-trade theory say about equation (1)? Several models predict that both η j and σ LL in equation (1) depend on various aspects of a country's international-trade patterns.
First, consider η j . Differentiation of (1) with respect to η j shows that as product demand becomes more elastic (i.e., η j rises), so does labor demand (i.e., η LLj falls): ∂η LLj ∂η j = -s < 0. The larger is labor's share in costs and revenue, the stronger is the pass-through from η j to η LLj . This effect of trade on labor demand is an application of one of the four Hicks-Marshallian laws of factor demand: "The demand for anything is likely to be more elastic, the more elastic is the demand for any further thing which it contributes to produce" (Hicks, 1964, p. 242 ).
Many models predict that trade makes a country's product markets more competitive. For example, domestic trade-policy liberalization can force domestic firms to face heightened foreign competition. Or developments abroad (e.g., factor accumulation and trade liberalization) can be communicated to domestic producers as more-intense foreign competition. Different models predict different magnitudes for η j . Models with perfectly-competitive product markets (e.g.,
Heckscher-Ohlin models) have the extreme result of infinitely-elastic η j 's and thus infinitely-elastic η LLj 's. Empirical estimates of actual η LLj 's never approach infinity, however, these models alone leave a gap between trade theory and the data. But several models of imperfect competition predict that trade liberalization makes factor demands more elastic--but not infinitely so.
One such model posits a domestic industry with a single firm competing against foreign producers while protected by an import quota which creates for the firm a linear residual-demand schedule. Helpman and Krugman (1989, chapter 3) show that relaxing the quota forces the domestic firm to cut output and price. It can be demonstrated that at this new output (on the new residual-demand schedule) product demand is now more elastic. 4 All else equal, this increases the industry's labor-demand elasticities.
A second example is a monopolistically-competitive industry producing for Dixit-Stiglitz consumers who value product variety. In this model the representative firm is usually assumed to face a demand elasticity equal to the elasticity of substitution (EOS) among product varieties in consumers' utility function. But the actual demand elasticity is only approximately equal to the EOS. It equals EOS plus a second term, (1-EOS) N , where N is the number of firms in the industry. Thus for a given level of N each firm faces an isoelastic demand schedule with η j = EOS
> 0 because EOS is assumed to be greater than one) and each firm's entire demand schedule shifts in. The number of firms--both domestic and foreign--competing in this industry can rise as a result of domestic trade liberalization or foreign developments such as factor accumulation which shifts the foreign output mix towards this industry. All else equal, the increase in η j triggered by more firms increases η LLj .
A third example is an the Armington home-bias story like that discussed in Trefler (1995) .
When consumers regard home and foreign product varieties as imperfect substitutes, the overall industry product-demand elasticity depends on the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign varieties. Trade liberalization which eases substitution increases the overall industry elasticity of demand and thus the derived elasticity of demand for labor.
How International Trade Affects Labor-Demand Elasticities: Substitution Effect
The second way through which international trade can increase η LLj is through σ LL , the constant-output elasticity of substitution between labor and all other factors. Suppose that an industry is vertically integrated with a number of production stages. With international trade stages can move abroad either within firms by establishing multinational enterprises with foreign affiliates (e.g., (Helpman 1984) ) or arm's length by buying the output of those stages from other firms (e.g., Feenstra and Hanson (1996) ). Trade thus gives access to foreign factors of production as well as domestic ones, either directly in foreign affiliates or indirectly through intermediate inputs.
Trade expands the set of factors industries can substitute towards in response to higher domestic wages beyond just domestic non-labor factors to include foreign factors as well. So a move from autarky to some trade should increase σ LL , and freer trade should tend to further increase σ LL . And industries need not actually access foreign factors to increase σ LL : the ability to do so is sufficient. 5
Differentiation of (1) with respect to σ LL shows that as this substitutability increases labor demand becomes more elastic (i.e., η LLj falls):
Also, the smaller is labor's share in the industry's costs and revenue, the stronger is the pass-through from σ LL to η LLj . For any given σ LL , higher wages trigger larger (smaller) changes in the quantity of labor demanded the less (more) important labor is in total costs.
To summarize: in theory, international trade can increase the equilibrium own-price elasticity of demand for domestic factors of production by increasing either η j or σ LL . 6
Industry-Level Labor Demand Versus Country-Level Labor Demand
The theory just presented is for the labor demand of industries. In contrast, Leamer (Leamer and Levinsohn 1995 , Leamer 1995 , Leamer 1996 and others have recently discussed the labor demand of entire countries. In particular, Leamer has emphasized that a sufficiently diversified small open economy has a national labor demand that is infinitely elastic. For this economy a change in the national factor endowment does not change national wages. Instead, it alters the national mix of outputs as predicted by the Rybczynski Theorem. Leamer (1995) argues that this result of the Heckscher-Ohlin model is best called the Factor Price Insensitivity (FPI) Theorem. 7 It is important to emphasize that industry labor-demand elasticities and national labor-demand elasticities are two conceptually distinct ideas. Both elasticities arise from the decentralized profitmaximizing input choices decisions of firms. But an industry elasticity describes how the quantity of labor demanded by a single industry responds to a wage change which is exogenous to that industry. As used by Leamer, a national elasticity describes how endogenously determined national wages respond to an exogenous change in national factor endowments. Leamer (1995, p.42) In general, then, labor-demand elasticities of industries and countries are two distinct ideas.
This paper is analyzing whether trade has made labor demand more elastic for U.S. industries--not for the country overall, which would require an alternative empirical strategy.
Stage-One Regressions: Estimating Labor-Demand Elasticities
Literature Survey Drazen, Hamermesh, and Obst (1984) , Lawrence and Lawrence (1985) , and Maskus and Bohara (1985) consider how labor-demand elasticities depend on product-market conditions. Drazen, Hamermesh, and Obst (1984) find some empirical evidence that labor-demand elasticities vary with product-market demand. Lawrence and Lawrence (1985) theorize that declining industries (such as U.S. steel in the 1970s) realize less-elastic labor demands--and thus more aggressive wage demands from their workers--because the substitutability between labor and capital declines when product-market demand declines. Maskus and Bohara (1985) estimate constant-output elasticities for one year on industries grouped as importables or exportables. Revenga (1992) , Abowd and Lemieux (1993) , and Borjas and Ramey (1995) don't focus on labor-demand elasticities, but they do address how product-market competitiveness affects wages and employment. Revenga (1992) tests how import product-market competition moves wages and employment in certain U.S. industries. Abowd and Lemieux (1993) study how international-price competition affects the collective-bargaining outcomes in Canadian firms. And Borjas and Ramey (1995) study how foreign competition reduces firms' product-market power and thus labor rents.
Finally, Levinsohn (1993) and Harrison (1994) Hamermesh (1983) argues that the measurement error introduced by average wage measures biases elasticity estimates up towards zero. But with measurement error in other factor prices as well the net bias is unclear. 11 If the measurement-error bias is relatively constant over time, however, then the true pattern in elasticity time trends is relatively unaffected. This would be good insofar as the primary concern of this paper is trends over time in elasticities rather than their levels.
Specification
To estimate labor-demand elasticities Hamermesh proposes a log-linear specification of quantity of factor employment regressed on factor prices. For each industry-year in the NBER panel, this suggests the following equation for estimating constant-output elasticities:
where I indexes factors, J industries, and T time. L jt , the quantity of labor employed (either production or nonproduction workers) in industry j at time t, is regressed on w ijt , a set of I nominal factor prices, and on Y jt , real output, with e jt a white-noise error term. Thanks to the loglinear specification, the parameters α ijt correspond to the cross-price and own-price labor-demand elasticities, where the individual α ijt for wages (either production or nonproduction, as appropriate) is the estimate of industry j's constant-output labor-demand elasticity at time t.
Similarly, for each industry-year equation (3) can be used to estimate total elasticities:
Here u jt is a white-noise error term, and the parameters Γ ijt correspond to the cross-price and ownprice labor-demand elasticities, where the individual Γ ijt for wages (either production or nonproduction, as appropriate) is the estimate of industry j's total labor-demand elasticity at time t.
D jt is a set of product-market demand controls for industry j at time t. The scale effect in equation
(1) measures how higher production costs reduce factor demands thanks to a reduction in the quantity of output demanded along a given product-demand schedule. Thus D jt needs to be included in equation (3) to avoid omitted-variables bias. In the analysis below I use three different variables in D jt : a multilateral real exchange rate where country weights are based on bilateral U.S.
exports; a weighted sum of foreign gross domestic product where country weights are again based on bilateral U.S. exports; and output in the rest of the world. All three controls vary by industry and year. The first two attempt to measure foreign demand for U.S. products, and the third attempts to measure overall world demand. If these regressors do not adequately control for shifts in product-market demand then estimates of Γ ijt are likely to be biased upwards to the extent that positive shocks to product-market demand and thus labor demand raise industry wages (for example, because of rent sharing). I will return to this problem below. 12
If both α ijt and Γ ijt are consistently estimated, then the difference between the two is an estimate of the scale effect from equation (1). Estimates of the scale effects would provide indirect evidence about product-market competitiveness.
Estimation Strategy: Identification
The identification problem in estimating equations (2) and (3) is that at the industry level, both labor demand and labor supply probably depend on wages. It is therefore not clear what combination of labor-demand and labor-supply elasticities is obtained from regressing labor quantities on labor prices. The identification assumption used in this paper is that industry-level labor supplies are perfectly elastic. Shifts in the labor-supply schedule, as measured by movements in wages, trace out the labor-demand schedule (whose position is controlled for by the non-labor factor prices and output or product-demand controls). If this assumption is true, then the parameter estimates α ijt and Γ ijt can be interpreted as labor-demand elasticities.
An alternative identification strategy would be to use instrumental variables to identify jointly both labor demand and labor supply. The reason for not using instrumental variables is practical:
the data set does not contain a good instrument for identifying labor demand. That is, the data set does not contain a variable that is plausibly included in the labor-supply equation but excluded from the labor-demand equation that can be used to shift labor supply along labor demand.
Plausible non-wage determinants of labor supply are not the output and non-labor input prices and quantities that constitute the rest of the data set. 13 Beyond the practical reason for assuming perfectly-elastic labor supplies, Hamermesh contends that the appropriateness of identifying assumptions depends on how disaggregated the data are.
Individual firms usually face perfectly-elastic labor supplies: given exogenous wages, firms choose employment. In contrast, an entire economy faces perfectly-inelastic labor supply: given exogenous quantities wages are endogenously determined. To the extent that 4-digit SIC industries are "closer" to firms than the entire economy, industry labor supply is "closer" to perfectly elastic than perfectly inelastic. This approach does have the merit of extensive use.
Almost all industry-level studies in Hamermesh's literature survey regress quantities on prices and interpret the estimates as demand elasticities.
If the identifying assumption of perfectly-elastic labor supply is violated then the estimated labor-demand elasticities will be biased upwards because of the positive correlation between wages and labor supply. However, as with the measurement-error bias, if the simultaneity bias in levels is constant over time, then the true pattern in trends should be relatively unaffected by this bias.
Estimation Strategy: Issues Particular to the NBER Productivity Data Base
The NBER Productivity Data Base raises two more specification issues. One is that non-wage factor prices are industry-specific indexes, not actual levels. This means that there is not meaningful cross-industry variation in the levels of factor prices. Taking time differences solves this problem because indexes do allow cross-sectional comparisons of changes. Thus any regressions which pool industries must be run in time differences, not levels.
Time-differencing also controls for unobserved time-invariant industry fixed effects influencing the level of labor demand (such as production technology). However, time-differencing can also aggravate regressor measurement error and result in inconsistent estimates. To minimize this inconsistency Griliches and Hausman (1986) suggest taking long differences. Accordingly, I
estimate equations (2) and (3) using three-year, five-year, and ten-year differences. Another advantage of longer differences is that over longer time horizons the maintained identifying assumption of perfectly-elastic labor supplies is more likely to hold. 14 The other specification issue is the proper use of the data's panel aspect. To maximize crossindustry variation in elasticities one would estimate each of the 450 industries separately with identification coming from each industry's time-series variation. However, this strategy would yield only 31 observations (at most) per industry. With several regressors in (2) and/or (3), estimation would require pooling almost all years and would thus preclude allowing the elasticities to vary over time. This suggests that allowing time-varying elasticities requires pooling industries together. The cost of this is the imposed restriction that elasticities be equal across industries.
In this paper I report results for two different approaches to balancing cross-sectional and timeseries pooling. One approach pools all 450 industries in each year. This yields annual "manufacturing-wide" elasticities, but it restricts all industries to share the same elasticities. To allow some variation within manufacturing, the second approach groups the 450 industries into eight different sectors and then estimates elasticities for each sector separately year by year. Table   1 lists the eight sectors along with the number of component 4-digit SIC industries for each. Each sector groups together the 4-digit industries within some 2-digit industries, and each is chosen based on similarity of capital per worker (the ordinal ranking of which is very stable over time)
output. So for each year, for both labor types nine own-price elasticities are estimated: one for all manufacturing pooled together and one for each of the eight different sectors. Any finer grouping of industries without offsetting time-series pooling makes parameter estimates very imprecise. 15 To conclude, for both production and nonproduction labor, constant-output and total elasticities (from equations (2) and (3), respectively) are estimated annually for manufacturing overall and for each of the eight industries within manufacturing. For each specification of a labor/elasticity/year/industry combination, six regressions are estimated. Both capital-price measures are used, and time differences of three, five, and ten years are also used. All specifications are estimated using ordinary least squares with White robust standard errors. 16 In several ways the constant-output estimates seem very plausible and well estimated. First, for all specifications their mean lies within the range of [-0.15, -0.75 ] that Hamermesh (1993) proposes as plausible based on his literature survey. Second, almost all point estimates are less than zero. In none of the six cases are more than six elasticities--well under 5% of the total--estimated to be positive. Third, the large majority of the elasticity estimates are statistically significant even with White robust standard errors. In all six cases, on average about two-thirds of the estimates are less than zero at the 5% level of significance (and none of the positive estimates are statistically significantly different from zero). Fourth, for each labor type there is a high correlation of the estimates across the three time differences. This is indicated by the closeness of the means across time differences. In addition, for each combination the sample pairwise correlations are between 0.27 and 0.52, all of which are significant beyond the 0.1% level.
Empirical Results: Summary Statistics of Elasticity Estimates
In contrast to the constant-output elasticity estimates, Table 2 also reveals that the total elasticity estimates seem much less plausible. First, all six total-elasticity means are smaller (in absolute value) than their respective constant-elasticity means. This contradicts the labor-demand theory behind equation (1), which states that the reverse should be true. In addition, in all six cases somewhere between 5% and 30% of the estimates are positive while only about one third of the estimates are less than zero at the 5% level of significance. As discussed earlier, a likely explanation for the upward bias and imprecision in the total-elasticity estimates is that the regressors D jt in equation (3) don't adequately control for cross-industry shifts in product demand.
Although the levels of the total elasticities seem to be poorly estimated, their time trends broadly match the time trends in the constant-output elasticities. Given this, most of the subsequent analysis uses the constant-output elasticities. Unfortunately, the poor total-elasticity estimates mask changes in product-market competitiveness working through the scale effect.
Empirical Results: Elasticity Estimates Over Time
The basic results are in Figures 1a and 1b , which plot manufacturing-wide constant-output elasticities each year for the specifications using three-year and five-year differencing. To represent better the underlying trends, the figures plot three-year moving averages of the estimated elasticities. There is a clear difference between nonproduction and production labor. Productionlabor demand became markedly more elastic. This elasticity fluctuated around -0.5 until the mid1970s, but then it declined steadily to around -1.0 by 1991. Nonproduction-labor demand did not become more elastic. Almost all estimates somewhere between -0.5 and -0.8, and if anything, demand seemed to become less elastic over time. These patterns are very consistent across both the three-year and five-year differenced specifications (and the omitted ten-year as well).
Figures 1a and 1b come from a specification which restricts all 450 four-digit SIC industries to have the same elasticities in each year. In fact, the data largely reject this restriction in favor of allowing elasticities to vary across the eight broad industries in Table 1 . For example, for the fiveyear differenced specifications the null of equal own-price labor-demand elasticities across all eight sectors is rejected for 26 of 29 years for production labor and 20 of 29 years for nonproduction labor. 17 Thus the all-manufacturing estimates are a convenient summary of the data, but they miss important cross-industry differences which the sector-by-sector estimates allow for. Across the eight sectors, for production labor demand was becoming more elastic in five industries: food and tobacco; textiles, apparel, and footwear; wood and paper products; metals; and instruments and miscellaneous. Elasticities look relatively constant in the other three industries: chemicals, petroleum, and rubber; stone, clay, glass, and transportation; and machinery. For nonproduction labor, in none of the eight industries do demand elasticities display any downward trend. If anything, demand in some of these industries seems to have grown less elastic. 18
To show these sectoral trends, Tables 3 and 4 And nearly three-fourths of these trends are significantly less than zero at or above the 90% level.
In contrast, none of the other three industries displays a downward trend--in fact, in one industry (stone, etc./transportation) demand is becoming significantly less elastic. As for nonproduction labor, no industry shows a downward trend in elasticities. In three industries (lumber, furniture, paper, and printing; primary and fabricated metals; and machinery) at least two specifications indicate demand was becoming less elastic.
Overall, the time series of elasticities indicate an important difference between production and nonproduction labor. Demand for production labor has become more elastic in manufacturing overall and in five of eight sectors within manufacturing. But demand for nonproduction labor has not become more elastic in manufacturing overall or in any of the sectors within manufacturing. 19
Stage-Two Regressions: Explaining Trends in Estimated Labor-Demand Elasticities Specification and Data Description
The issue now is to explain what caused changes in labor-demand elasticities. One approach to doing this is to solve a well-specified general-equilibrium model for labor-demand elasticities in terms of exogenous variables, some of which are presumably trade-related such as trade policies and transportation costs. This would generate one or more structural equations to be estimated.
An alternative approach is to estimate a reduced-form equation of estimated elasticities on a set of exogenous explanatory regressors from the implicit structural model.
I adopt the second approach because it is not clear what single trade model is most appropriate.
To explain the estimated elasticities I use the following reduced-form regression.
(4) (PED) jt = a + ∑ K b k (exogenous factors jkt ) + ∑ J γ j (ID j )+ ∑ t δ t (TD t ) + e jt .
In equation (4), (PED) it is a set of elasticities estimated from a particular specification in stage one for J industries over T years; there are K different exogenous factors that vary by industry-year to explain the elasticities; ID j is a full set of industry dummies; and TD t is a full set of time dummies.
The set of K exogenous factors should include measures of (at least) international trade, technology, and labor-market institutions. Other relevant factors (e.g., U.S. antitrust policy affecting product-market competitiveness) are controlled for by the industry and time dummies.
Industry dummies control for industry-specific time-invariant level differences in elasticities that are not accounted for by the K regressors (e.g., industry-specific technology). Time dummies control for industry-shared time-varying level differences in the elasticities that are not accounted for by the K regressors (e.g., input-price changes); I also try a more-restrictive time trend. There are ten trade measures, three technology measures, and one measure of labor-market institutions. Most of these variables have been used in recent studies of rising U.S. wage inequality. This makes them plausible variables for explaining labor-demand elasticities.
All variables are constructed to match the industry-year panel of the estimated elasticities. In addition to the summary statistics, the table also lists each variable's hypothesized effect on the estimated elasticities for both production and nonproduction labor. Because the estimated elasticities are (almost all) less than zero, a hypothesized positive effect means that an increase in the regressor should make labor demand less elastic (i.e., make the elasticity less negative).
Similarly, a hypothesized negative effect means that an increase in the regressor should make labor demand more elastic (i.e., make the elasticity more negative). Here is a summary of each variable's definition, data source, and hypothesized effect on the elasticities.
• Trade measure #1: transportation costs, . These are constructed as the ratio of c.i.f. (cost, insurance, and freight) import value to customs import value. Declining transportation costs should make international product markets more competitive; this should make all factor demands more elastic via the scale effect.
• Trade measure #2: U.S. share of world value added, United Nations (1996) . This is an alternative measure of how competitive international product-markets are. The more the rest of the world accounts for an industry's worldwide output, the more competitive that industry is for U.S. firms and thus the more elastic all factor demands will be via the scale effect.
• Trade measure #3: percentage change in U.S. producer prices, NBER (1997). The assumption here is that larger price increases signal less price competition in output markets and thus less-elastic factor demands via the scale effect.
• Trade measure #4: percentage change in U.S. producer prices plus percentage change in totalfactor productivity (tfp), NBER (1997). Following Leamer (1996) , these "adjusted" price changes assume that any tfp growth passes through 100% to reduced prices. The sum of price changes and tfp changes is thus the price change attributable to globalization. Its effect on factor demand is as in measure #3.
• Trade measure #5: outsourcing broadly measured, Feenstra and Hanson (1997) . This measures the share of all intermediate inputs that are imported. Increased outsourcing is assumed to make demand more (less) elastic for production (nonproduction) labor via the substitution effect. Foreign outsourcing provides an alternative to many production-laborintensive activities done in the U.S. but also increases reliance on U.S. nonproduction labor (in part to coordinate the outsourced activities).
• Trade measure #6: outsourcing narrowly measured, Feenstra and Hanson (1997) . This measures only intermediate inputs imported in the same 2-digit SIC industry as the importer.
Its effect on labor demand is as in measure #5.
• Trade measure #7: foreign-affiliate share of U.S. multinationals' total assets, U.S. Department of Commerce (various years). This is a more narrow measure of outsourcing in that it looks only at within-firm activity done by U.S.-headquartered multinationals. Its effect on labor demand is as in measure #5.
• Trade measure #8: foreign-affiliate share of U.S. multinationals' total employment, U.S.
Department of Commerce (various years)
. This is another more narrow measure of outsourcing. Its effect on labor demand is as in measure #5.
• Trade measure #9: ratio of imports to shipments, . This is another possible measure of the competitiveness of product markets. The assumption is that more import penetration signals more competition. This makes demands more elastic via the scale effect.
• Trade measure #10: ratio of net-exports to shipments, . This is another possible measure of the competitiveness of product markets. The assumption is that higher net exports signals less foreign competition. This makes demands less elastic via the scale effect.
• Technology measure #1: percentage change in total-factor productivity (tfp), NBER (1997). It is assumed that higher tfp growth represents technological change which makes production labor more substitutable with the new technology but which increases reliance on nonproduction labor. This changes demands differentially through the substitution effect.
• Technology measure #2: share of computers in total capital stock, Berndt and Morrison (1995) . The assumption here is that more computers make production labor more substitutable but nonproduction less so. This changes demands differentially via the substitution effect.
• Technology measure #3: share in total capital stock of computers plus other "high-tech" equipment, Berndt and Morrison (1995) . Its effect on labor demand is assumed to be the same as for the previous technology measure.
• Labor-market institutions measure #1: percentage of production workers unionized, Abowd (1991). Greater unionization is assumed to make production-labor demand less elastic. Its predicted effect on nonproduction-labor demand is not clear, so this relationship is not tested.
Estimation Strategy
There are three issues to mention regarding the estimation strategy. One is the exogeneity of the regressors. Some of them might actually be endogenous variables in a fully-specified model.
For example, the outsourcing and capital-stock measures are endogenously chosen input quantities. In addition, imports and net exports are endogenous outcomes of consumption and production decisions. In contrast, the two most plausibly exogenous trade measures are transportation costs and the U.S. share of world value added. If some regressors are endogenous, then least-squares parameter estimates will suffer endogeneity bias, the net direction of which is not clear. Despite this potential problem, for lack of valid instruments I use least squares. 21 A second issue is the fact that the dependent variable in equation (4) is estimated, not observed.
This means that the error term e jt in (4) is heteroskedastic with mean zero and additive variance equal to the variance of the error term of the stage-one regression plus the variance of the estimated elasticity PED jt . Controlling for heteroskedasticity requires weighting less heavily observations whose elasticities that are relatively imprecisely estimated. To do this, following Anderson (1993) I proceed as follows. First I run equation (4) Table 6 reports estimation results for production labor and Table 7 for nonproduction labor.
Empirical Results
The results are from specifications using five-year constant-output elasticities as regressands and using only a single exogenous factor as a regressor. For brevity I report only one full set of results for each labor type. Many other specifications were run using other estimated elasticities as regressands and using multiple exogenous factors as regressors. In addition, because the proper specification for equation (4) is not clear, I also tried some specifications with changes in elasticities (both level and percentage) as regressands. The overall results were robust to these different specifications; I show some of these checks below. In particular, results were quite similar between comparable constant-output and total elasticities. In theory, because of the scaleeffect difference between the two this need not be the case. But in the data these elasticities are sufficiently correlated to yield similar results. Because of this, Tables 6 and 7 report results for constant-output elasticities even though some regressors in theory influence the scale effect.
For production labor, the main message of Table 6 is that time fixed effects dominate the explanatory power of most of the trade and technology measures. Eight of the 14 measures (product prices; product prices plus tfp growth; broad and narrow outsourcing; imports and net exports as a share of shipments; and computers and high-tech capital as a share of total capital) have the correct hypothesized sign and a t-statistic of at least one (in absolute value) with both no controls and industry fixed effects. And an additional three (transportation costs; U.S. valueadded share; and U.S. affiliate asset shares) have the correctly predicted sign with t-statistics above one when industry fixed-effects are included. But for all 11 of these controls time dummies either reduce the parameter estimates to insignificantly different from zero or even make them statistically significant but opposite of the hypothesized sign. Only four regressors (broad outsourcing, both MNC measures, and tfp growth) have the hypothesized sign with the full set of controls, but none of the four is statistically significant at even the 90% level.
This dominance of the time effects appears to be driven by the fact that the regressors do not contain enough cross-sectional variation over time that is independent of time itself to explain the In contrast to the results for production labor, here many regressors do have enough crossindustry variation over time independent of time itself to explain as predicted some of the variation in estimated elasticities. But as with production labor, when time's effect is captured with a time trend instead of time dummies it has a significant effect in almost all specifications. Now, however, the estimated coefficient is positive, not negative. As was seen in the stage-one regressions, nonproduction-labor demand becomes progressively less elastic.
Overall, the results in Tables 6 and 7 provide mixed support, at best, for the hypothesis that international trade has contributed to changes in U.S. labor-demand elasticities. For production labor many trade variables have the predicted effect for specifications with only industry controls, but these predicted effects disappear when time controls are included as well. For nonproduction labor things are somewhat better. Four plausible trade-trade variables have the predicted sign at at least the 90% level of significance when both industry and time controls are included. For both labor types time is a very strong predictor of elasticity patterns with production (nonproduction) demand becoming progressively more (less) elastic over time.
Discussion of Empirical Results
There are four issues related to these results worth briefly discussing. First, the results in Tables 6 and 7 are generally robust to alternative specifications which include more than one regressor (with various trade-variable combinations selected to minimize obvious multicollinearity and to minimize both theoretical similarity and small-sample problems). This matters because the reduced-form nature of equation (4) means the appropriate regressor set is unclear. 22 A second issue is that the three regressors which seem most robust across both labor types --the two outsourcing measures and the multinational-asset measure --are regressors which predict a differential effect between the two labor types. This squares with the stage-one finding that the predominant forces on U.S. labor-demand elasticities are affecting production and nonproduction labor differently. Product-market developments and their implicit scale effects cannot be the main force because within industries scale effects move all factor demands in the same direction.
Instead, forces differentially changing labor substitutability must be playing a major role. The stage-two results provide some evidence that trade is doing this by making production labor more easily substituted for foreign factors of production.
A third issue with the trade measures might be that it is not actual trade that matters but rather potential trade. That is, what might matter for labor demand is just the ability to transact internationally regardless of whether such transactions actually occur. Product markets might become more competitive from increased contact with foreign producers even if product-market prices or quantities don't change. Similarly, factor substitutability might increase from easier access to foreign factors of production even if firms do not actually do this. Thus trade might be playing a large role without any change in econometric observables such as output prices, quantities, trade flows, and foreign-direct investment flows. 23 The final issue, how to interpret time's role in explaining elasticities, is related to these measurement problems. Again, in the full specification with time fixed effects transportation costs (and lots of other regressors) have the incorrect sign at least partly because they have insufficient cross-industry variation over time that is independent of time itself to explain the elasticities in the predicted way. The time controls are appropriate regressors if the other included regressors do not account for all time-varying factors influencing elasticities. Unfortunately, because equation (4) is a reduced-form equation this issue cannot be unambiguously resolved. This raises the question of whether time's role can justifiably be attributed to trade, technology, or other factors. For example, perhaps trade's true effect is to increase its "threat" over time--both in terms of productmarket competitiveness and factor substitutability--independent of actual changes in econometric observables. This might be a reason to attribute time's explanatory power to trade. On the other hand, perhaps computerization's true effect is a similar "threat" independent of whether computers are actually used. In this case perhaps time should be attributed to technology. Overall, there is a large unexplained residual for changing factor demand elasticities--similar to the common finding that observed measures of trade and technology explain only part of rising wage inequality.
Conclusion
The goal of this paper has been to determine whether international trade has increased U.S.
industries' equilibrium own-price elasticity of demand for labor. The paper has three main results.
First, over time demand for production labor has become more elastic in manufacturing overall and in five of eight industries within manufacturing. The elasticity fluctuated around -0.5 until the mid-1970s, but then it dropped steadily to around -1.0 by 1991. Second, nonproduction-labor demand has not become more elastic in manufacturing overall or in any of the industries within manufacturing. Almost all estimates range somewhere between -0.5 and -0.8, and if anything, demand seems to be growing less elastic over time.
For production labor many trade variables have the predicted effect for specifications containing as regressors only these variables or them plus industry fixed effects. However, these predicted effects generally disappear when time controls are included as well. For nonproduction labor things are somewhat better. Four plausible trade-related variables--narrow and broad outsourcing, the foreign-affiliate share of U.S. multinational corporations' assets, and net exports as a share of shipments--have the predicted sign at at least the 90% level of significance even when both industry and time controls are included. For both labor types, time itself is a very strong predictor of elasticity patterns. This result parallels the common finding in studies of wage inequality. Just as there appears to be a large unexplained residual for changing factor prices, there also appears to be a large unexplained residual for changing factor demand elasticities.
Data Appendix
For trade variable #1 (transportation costs) the import-value data go back only to 1974. For trade variable #2 (U.S. share of world value added) the original U.N. data start in only 1963 and they are reported by ISIC manufacturing industries. These are concorded up to the eight industries used in this paper. For trade variables #2 and #3 (percentage change in product prices and percentage change in product prices less tfp) and for technology variable #1 (percentage change in tfp), the original data are for 4-digit SIC industry/year observations. These are aggregated up to the appropriate industry-years using the value of shipments as weights. For both outsourcing variables (trade measures #5 and #6) and for the remaining two technology variables, the data are available for only three years : 1972, 1979, and 1990 . Also, these data are originally at the 4-digit SIC level; they are aggregated up using the value of shipments as weights. For the multinational variables (trade measures #7 and #8) the data are available only for 1977 and 1982 forward.
Finally, the unionization variable (institution measure #1) is reported in Abowd (1991) for only three years : 1974, 1980, and 1984 . In all instances of weighting original data to generate data for the eight sectors used in this paper, very similar results are obtained using alternative weights. imperfectly competitive in autarky, opening can also make product markets more competitive.
2 Rodrik (1997, p. 26) argues there is reason to think that the main impact of globalization on labor markets falls on elasticities rather than on prices. In a Heckscher-Ohlin world pressure on factor prices comes from trade with countries with dissimilar relative endowments. But pressure on elasticities can come from trade with any kind of countries.
3 The distribution of volatility between wages and employment depends on the slope of the laborsupply schedule. If labor supply is perfectly inelastic (elastic) then labor-demand shocks trigger only wage (employment) volatility.
4 Let the firm's demand be Q = (a-x)-bP, where x is the level of the quota. Assume constant marginal production costs equal to c (This assumption is not crucial: the result holds for increasing marginal costs as well.). Given this market structure, the equilibrium η j equals -(x-a-bc) (a-x-bc) > 0.
Relaxing the quota increases x. The effect of this on η j is given by ∂η j ∂x = 2bc (a-x-bc) 2 > 0. Thus as the quota relaxes, the equilibrium η j becomes more elastic.
5 In subsequent empirical work the price of imported intermediate inputs is captured in the variable measuring the price of all U.S. intermediate inputs.
6 Changes in labor's share of costs, s, also change η LLj . But it is not clear how international trade affects s. For example, if trade liberalization changes a country's relative product prices and thus its relative factor prices, within each industry firms attempt to substitute towards using more of the now-cheaper factor(s) of production and less of the now-dearer factor(s) of production. How cost shares change overall depends on production technology. Also, even when the direction of change in s is known the effect on η LLj depends on the relative sizes of σ LL and η j .
7 Smallness is particularly important for FPI: the change in national output must be sufficiently small to leave world product prices unaffected. If national output changes do change world product prices, then domestic factor prices change as well through the Stolper-Samuelson process.
8 Richardson and Khripounova (1996) also estimate the time pattern of U.S. labor demand elasticities, but their approach is patterned after regressions run in an earlier draft of this paper.
9 Payroll data do not include Social Security or employer payments for some fringe benefits.
Production employees are defined as employees most directly connected with carrying out manufacturing activities of the business being reported, up to and including working foremen.
Nonproduction employment counts only employees at manufacturing establishments. It excludes those employed at auxiliary/administrative establishments. The fact that only production-site nonproduction workers are reported should not affect demand estimates for production labor as long as the earnings for production-site nonproduction workers match the earnings for auxiliarysite nonproduction workers. But this should be kept in mind for the estimates of nonproductionlabor demand. Unfortunately, auxiliary-site nonproduction employment is publicly available only for Census of Manufactures years and only at the 2-digit SIC level. Also, results using hourly quantities and wages are very similar to results using the annual measures.
10 I thank Jason Cummins at New York University for providing the user-cost data.
11 Clark and Freeman (1980) prove that labor-demand elasticities are still biased upwards in the case where other factor prices such as capital rentals have relatively more measurement error.
Their proposed empirical solution to this problem is not to impose any restrictions on parameter estimates even if the restrictions are implied by some production technology. This actually is a reason to prefer the flexible specifications in equations (2) and (3).
12 I thank Andrew Bernard of Yale University for providing me with the exchange-rate variable.
Note that equations (2) and (3) assume no time lags greater than one year between factor-price changes and factor quantity responses. This follows Hamermesh's (1983) finding that typical adjustment lags are six months to one year.
13 To address the simultaneity problem, lagged wages are commonly used as regressors (it is not entirely clear how this solves the problem, although the identifying assumption presumably must be that people's labor-supply decisions take time to respond to industry wages while firms' labordemand decisions do not). This approach is not taken here because (as will be discussed)
equations (2) and (3) must be estimated in time differences, not levels. Differences of logs are approximately growth rates, and in the data current and lagged wage growth rates are very weakly correlated--a sample correlation of just under 0.02 for both production labor and nonproduction labor. As a result, the lagged-wage regressors generate imprecise elasticity estimates that are not reported. In a similar fashion, one might also worry about bias introduced by the endogeneity of output, as output is simultaneously determined along with labor demand. However, as with wages current and lagged output growth rates are also weakly correlated. In addition, Quandt and Rosen (1989) test the assumption of output exogeneity in an equilibrium labor-demand model like this paper's framework by adding a Cobb-Douglas production function to the estimation system. The assumption of output exogeneity cannot be rejected by the data, and Quandt and Rosen (p. 400) "conclude that the convenient assumption that output is exogenous is likely to produce results that are just as good as those generated by the more theoretically attractive assumption of endogeneity."
14 Industry-specific skills obtained on the job might tend to make industry labor supply more inelastic. Longer time horizons make this supply more elastic by allowing people more opportunity to break these industry attachments. Time differencing might also mitigate the measurement error due to missing non-wage labor costs. Bosworth and Perry (1994) find that the difference in the growth of total compensation and wages has disappeared from a surprisingly small initial amount. From 1960-1973 average hourly compensation grew 0.4 percent faster per year than average wages, and since 1983 they have grown at the same rate.
15 An earlier draft of this paper reported results from disaggregating manufacturing into the 20 2-digit SIC industries but then pooling each 2-digit industry decade by decade. The broad patterns in elasticity estimates from this earlier approach are similar to the results in this paper. Also, note that pooling across industries requires factor-price data which varies across industries. This precludes me from using other commonly used wage data (such as the Employment Cost Index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics) which do not contain adequate industry disaggregation.
16 For either (2) or (3), there are no cross-equation restrictions between the two equations for the two labor types that can improve efficiency by estimating the two labor demands simultaneously.
17 F-test with 7 and 436 degrees of freedom and a 95% critical value of the F statistic of 2.01.
18 For brevity, figures for the eight sectors have been omitted. They are available upon request.
In almost all sectors, for many years demand is estimated to be more elastic for nonproduction labor than for production labor. If nonproduction workers tend to be more skilled than production workers, this finding differs from the literature survey in Hamermesh (1993) , where most studies find that demand becomes less elastic as the skills of a group of workers increases. One possible explanation is that skill distributions of these two worker categories actually overlap a lot. Another is that the endogeneity problem is more severe for production workers. Also, despite their imprecision the total elasticities generally show even stronger trends than the constant-output ones. Tables 3 and 4 could also have been obtained by estimating equations (2) and (3) with the modification of interacting the wage regressors with time. I use my method because it is easier to correctly adjust the stage-two coefficient standard errors using my approach.
The information in
As I discuss below, this adjustment uses information on the stage-one coefficient standard errors, and the calculations are simpler the fewer are the stage-one coefficients. 20 I thank Gordon Hanson of the University of Michigan for providing me with some of the data.
21 To control for endogeneity I tried using regressors lagged one year (where possible) instead of contemporaneous regressors. The results were similar; for brevity lagged results are not reported.
22 These robustness checks are omitted for brevity, and are available upon request. Point estimates vary somewhat as sample sizes shrink, but this is to be expected.
23 In contrast, many of the channels through which trade affects factor prices do necessarily involve changes in econometric observables. For example, in standard Heckscher-Ohlin models, for the Stolper-Samuelson process to affect factor prices, relative product prices must first change. Total and constant-output elasticities are estimated by equations (2) and (3). These statistics summarize only the eight disaggregated industries: they do not include estimates for all manufacturing pooled together. All time trends estimated from regressing the specified set of elasticities on a time trend and a constant. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels. All time trends estimated from regressing the specified set of elasticities on a time trend and a constant. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels. All time trends estimated from regressing the specified set of elasticities on a time trend and a constant. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels. All time trends estimated from regressing the specified set of elasticities on a time trend and a constant. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels. Stage-two regressions run estimated labor-demand elasticities on these regressors.
The final two columns report the hypothesized effect of each regressor on production and nonproduction elasticities, respectively. Stage-two regressions run estimated labor-demand elasticities on these regressors using weighted least squares. The specification is: (4)(PED)it = a + ∑jbj(exogenous factorsijt) + ∑igi(IDi)+ ∑tdt(TDt) + eit . 
